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ABSTRACT 
A cornerstone of planning in many communities is needs assessment, which often is 
accomplished by collecting citizen opinions through mailed questionnaires. Atypical 
example would be where residents are presented a list of services and asked to rate their level 
of satisfaction with them or indicate whether the services should receive more or less funding. 
In addition to substantive responses, respondents might also be afforded the opportunity to 
indicate a "no opinion" or "don't know" response to these questions. In the absence of a "no 
opinion" or "don't know" option, the respondents might choose not to answer a question or 
choose a neutral response. This research uses asplit-ballot experiment to examine how "no 
opinion" or "don't know" response options affect community needs assessment surveys. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Measuring public opinion from responses to closed ended questions on social survey 
instruments presents difficult challenges for social scientists because responses vary 
depending upon the research design and questionnaire construction. The large volume of 
literature on this subject demonstrates, for example, that variations in question wording 
(Payne 1950; Converse and Presser 1986; Bradburn and Sudman 1988), question order 
(Schuman and Presser 1981; Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000; Moore 2002), number 
and description of response categories (Kalton, Collins, and Brook 1978; Presser and 
Schuman 1980; Schwarz et al. 1991; Alwin 1992), the use and type of incentives (Church 
1993; Dillman 2000; Singer, Groves, and Corning 1999), survey mode (Aquillino 1994; 
Tourangeau and Smith 1996; Holbrook, Green, and Krosnick 2003), length of survey 
(Herberlein and Baumgartner 1978; Herzog and Bachman 1981; Dillman, Sinclair, and 
Clark 1993), and other design and questionnaire characteristics (For a review see Bradburn 
and Sudman 1988) can affect survey and item response rates and the nature of responses. 
Among such considerations are the potential effects on responses resulting from 
providing "don't know" or "no opinion" response options to closed-ended questions. A 
couple of important questions might be considered regarding these options. First, the 
inclusion of these alternative responses leads one to wonder how subjects might have 
responded had these options not been provided, or similarly, how responses might have been 
affected by their inclusion. Previous studies have shown that the inclusion of don't know or 
no opinion filters increases ones propensity to select the options (Schuman and Presser 1979; 
Kalton, Collins, and Brook 1978) and that more strongly worded filters increase this effect 
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(Schuman and Presser 1981). A related and unexplored question with respect to self 
administered mail questionnaires is whether a person's propensity to select these options 
depends on whether they were offered either a don't know or a no opinion option. 
Second, one might consider the question of why responses to a question might change 
with the inclusion of these options. There are two theoretical perspectives regarding the use 
of don't know or no opinion filters. The nonattitude reduction hypothesis (Converse 1964; 
1970) proposed in the 1960's suggests that the inclusion of don't know and no opinion filters 
is necessary to reduce the reporting of nonattitudes. This perspective argues that without 
such ari option respondents will feel pressure to respond to an attitude question more or less 
randomly because they do not have an opinion but feel obligated to provide one. Such 
responses do not have to be random, but can take different forms unrelated to the intended 
measurement, such as answering in response sets or answering based on some broadly-
defined underlying attitude (Smith 1984). 
The satisficing perspective (Krosnick 1991), in contrast, argues that don't know and 
no opinion options are invitations for respondents to avoid the necessary cognitive effort to 
provide answers to survey questions. In other words, this perspective argues that no opinion 
filters might filter out non-attitudes, but also encourage people who do have opinions to not 
respond. These alternative perspectives demonstrate that the question of whether to include 
don't know or no opinions is still unsettled. 
Although it is often interesting to make distinctions between respondents who are not 
sure, don't know, or have no opinion, the limitation of space in the context of a respondent 
friendly questionnaire (Dillman 2000) prevents researchers from including all such options. 
Therefore, decisions have to be made about which options should be included. This study 
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will help inform survey designers of the benefits and costs of including either a don't know 
or no opinion response option. The purpose of this research is then to help survey designers 
decide how to make better use of the limited space that is available on a questionnaire and 
better understand why people select different response options. Implicit to understanding the 
potential effects of offering various response options to closed-ended questions and testing 
theories of why people choose various response options is knowing how the social-
demographic and social-psychological characteristics of respondents influence their 
predisposition to mark the middle-response category or select the "don't know" or "no 
opinion" options. If social scientists had a better understanding of why people choose the 
middle category or alternative response option, then they would be better informed about 
how to construct questionnaires for different audiences andlor topics and more 
knowledgeable about how to interpret results from responses to closed-ended questions. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATI:IRE REVIEW 
This literature review is organized into two sections. The first section covers the 
research on how don't know and no opinion response options can influence responses to 
questionnaires. Throughout this section I will use the phrase "no opinion" to cover all non-
substantive answers (don't know, no opinion, etc..) because much of the literature does not 
distinguish between them. The second section reviews research that has attempted to 
distinguish between don't know and no opinion responses. Chapter 2 also reviews theories 
about why don't know and no opinion response options might influence responses to 
questionnaires. 
How DK and No options influence responses 
The selection of response options and how the options are labeled represent important 
decisions for survey designers. This is true for both substantive and non-substantive 
response options. The response options that respondents see or hear clarify which answers 
are acceptable for them to select. In the case of substantive response categories, it has been 
shown that the range of values and labeling of response options leads to different results. For 
example, most research suggests that 7-point scales are preferred to 5- point or 3-point scales, 
due to their increased reliability (Cox 1980). In addition, labeling a scale from 0-10 has been 
found to yield different results from a scale that is labeled —5 to +5 (Schwarz et al. 1991). 
Including non-substantive categories (such as don't know and no opinion) 
communicates to the respondent that such an answer is acceptable. The degree to which 
these answers should be encouraged has been a topic of debate among survey researchers. A 
strong case was made for no opinion response options in the 1960's when an examination of 
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panel data from the National Election Studies (NES) revealed that, even though the marginal 
percentages were steady, the American public's opinions were fluctuating greatly over time. 
This evidence led researchers to conclude that without a no opinion option respondents were 
likely to feel pressured to provide a response to survey interviews and thereby "flip a mental 
coin" to choose a response option without giving any thought to the question (Converse 
1970). Accordingly, researchers speculated that nearly 80 percent of the American public 
was responding to opinion surveys with nothing more than guesswork and thereby many 
have advocated the use of no opinion response options or filter questions (Payne 1950; 
Bogart 1967; Vaillancourt 1973; Converse and Presser 1976). This line of reasoning has 
been referred to as the "non-attitude reduction hypothesis" (Krosnick 2002). 
Subsequent evidence from experimental designs has led to a better understanding of 
the effect of including no opinion response options. Split-ballot experiments allow 
researchers to manipulate a single feature of a questionnaire and test for the effects of this 
manipulation. This technique has been used to explore a diverse range of methodological 
issues in attitude measurement, such as order effects (Schuman and Presser 1981; Schwarz 
and Rippler 1995), the effect of including middle options (Presser and Schuman 1980; 
Kalton, Collins and Brook 1978), the effect of numeric scale values, and the effects of scale 
labels (Schwarz et al. 1991). 
Split-ballot experiments have also been utilized to study the effect of including no 
opinion response options. Participants typically are randomly assigned to groups so that 
some complete forms with a no opinion option and others complete forms without such an 
option. Traditionally, the form without the no opinion option has been called the standard 
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form, whereas the form with the no opinion option is called the filtered form (Schuman and 
Presser 1978). 
Split-ballot experiments affirm that including a no opinion response option does 
influence a respondent's propensity to admit that they do not have an opinion. The inclusion 
of don't know and no opinion filters increases the proportion of respondents who will admit 
they do not have an opinion and thus reduce the proportion who offer an opinion (Kalton, 
Collins, and Brook 1978; Schuman and Presser 1978; Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 
1983; Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 1986; Ayidiya and McClendon 1990; Krosnick 
2002). Schuman and Presser (1978), for example, found that on average, no opinion filters 
increased no opinion responses by 22-25 percent regardless of question content. Other 
research (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1983) has found that this increase is dependent 
upon item content, with more obscure issues attracting higher percentages of no opinion 
responses. 
Other research has shown that the explicitness of the filter influences the size of the 
percentage of respondents who are likely to indicate that they have no opinion (Kalton, 
Collins, and Brook 1978; Schuman and Presser 1978; Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 
1983). Two types of filters are most common in surveys. A full filter emphasizes prior to 
the asking of a question that it is perfectly acceptable to answer don't know or no opinion, 
whereas a quasi filter includes a don't know or no opinion option as an alternative answer. 
Full filters have been shown to have the largest effect on respondents inducing higher 
proportions of respondents to choose the option than quasi-filters. 
Individuals who answer no opinion when it is explicitly offered, but do not in the 
absence of a filter have been characterized as "floaters" (Schuman and Presser 1979). This 
7 
floating activity is a major topic of interest in experimental studies. Several questions in the 
research address the behavior of floaters. 
How do floaters influence the overall distribution of responses? This is an important 
question because it addresses the issue of whether survey results might change depending on 
whether filters are used. Fortunately, the question can be answered by excluding the no 
opinion responses on both standard and filtered forms. Doing this allows one to examine 
how floaters affect the other substantive categories. Generally,, univariate distributions do 
not seem to change significantly due to floating. Schuman and Presser (1979) found that on 
8 of 11 items the distribution of substantive positions did not differ significantly between 
standard and filtered forms. Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber (1983), however, report 
instances in which conclusions based on marginal distributions would have been different 
depending on whether a standard or filtered form was used. They found that 60% of 
respondents on a standard form preferred a government solution to national problems, 
whereas 54% favored a private solution to national problems on the filtered form. So this 
finding entertains the possibility that one's conclusions could change depending on whether 
standard or filtered forms are used. 
Another important question is whether floaters influence the relationships between 
items. Two conflicting findings are shown in the literature with respect to this question. 
First, it has been shown that associations between some variables increase with the use of 
filters (Schuman and Presser 1979). On the other hand, some associations tend to decrease 
with the use of filters (Schuman and Presser 1979; McClendon and Alwin 1993). Whether a 
correlation increases or decreases is proposed to be a function of the degree to which a 
respondent has any information about the variables in questions (Schuman and Presser 1979). 
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Floaters generally have no specific information about a specific question; however, they 
might have an underlying attitude that is broadly related to the specific question. In this case, 
it is likely that the standard form will show a meaningful association between two items that 
will not appear on a filtered form. On the other hand, when floaters have meaningless 
orientations (not related to any general underlying attitude) it is likely that associations 
between variables will be smaller on the standard form than the filtered form. Therefore, 
correlations are affected in the instance that floaters are homogenous with respect to some 
third underlying variable, but not affected when floaters' opinions are random or meaningless. 
Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber (1983) found that floating is likely to increase 
with more obscure issues. The nonattitudes hypothesis, paired with the finding that more 
people report that they do not have an opinion on a filtered form versus a standard form, 
leads one to wonder whether people would be willing to make up answers to questions that 
contain obscure or even fictitious information. Studies (Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 
1986, Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1983, Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, and Bennet 
1980; Schuman and Presser 1981) have asked respondents questions about obscure or 
.fictitious issues such as The Agricultural Trade Act of 1978, The Monetary Control Bill of 
1979, and The 1975 Public Affairs Act. Whether the issues were obscure or completely 
fictitious really did not matter as respondents who were likely to answer fictitious issues were 
also likely to answer real, but obscure issues (Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, and Bennet 
1980). 
Studies using fictitious issues revealed that approximately one third of the American 
public was willing to provide an opinion on a standard form regarding an issue that they 
know little or nothing about (Schuman and Presser 1981; Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, and 
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Bennett 1980; Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 1986). Less educated respondents (Bishop, 
Oldendick, Tuchfarber and Bennett 1980; Schuman and Presser 1981; Bishop, Tuchfarber, 
and Oldendick 1986) and blacks (Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber and Bennett 1980; Bishop, 
Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 1986) were more likely to offer opinions for fictitious issues on a 
standard form, which was attributed to face-saving behavior before the mostly white upper-
class interviewing staff. Research has found no differences by education or race on filtered 
forms. Respondent uncertainty was also apparent in these studies. Many initially answered 
don't know, but when probed for more information provided responses (Schuman and 
Presser 1981). 
An emerging theme in these studies is that while some respondents tend to avoid the 
use of don't know, many respondents seem to be falling back on a more generalized, but 
related attitude to a specific policy (Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, and Bennett 1980; 
Schuman and Presser 1981). Another possibility is that they were imputing meaning from 
previous questions in the survey (Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, and Bennett 1980; Smith 
1984). In other words, these studies offered more evidence that nonattitude holders were not 
necessarily answering randomly, but were using either broad underlying attitudes or cues 
from the questionnaire to impute an answer. 
Non experimental studies have shown that certain social demographic or social 
psychological characteristics of respondents are related to the use of no opinion responses. 
Social demographic characteristics found to be related to greater no opinion responding 
generally include low education (Converse 1976-1977; Faulkenberry and Mason 1978; 
Ferber 1966; Francis and Busch 1975; Glenn 1969), low occupational prestige (Francis and 
Busch 1975), low income (Francis and Busch 1975), sex (Atkeson and Rapoport 2003; 
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Ferber 1956; Ferber 1966; Francis and Busch 1975; Glenn 1969; Rapaport 1982; Rapaport 
1986), and age (Ferber 1966; Gergen and Back 1966; Smith 1978). Social psychological 
factors such as alienation (Atkeson and Rapoport 2003; Francis and Busch 1975; Rapaport 
1982; Rapaport 1986), low cognitive centrality (Converse 1964), low cognitive ability 
(Krosnick et al. 2002; Krosnick and Milburn 1990), low issue involvement (Francis and 
Busch 1975), low feelings of political efficacy (Francis and Busch 1975), low information 
(Faulkeberry and Mason 1978), low behavioral experience (Durand and Lambert 1988), and 
low intensity (Brim 1955) also have been shown to be positively related to no opinion 
responses. 
It is important to note that the research on the relationships above is somewhat 
conflicting because many of the findings are not replicated in the literature and some are 
contradicted, especially in the case of age where no relationship has been found after 
controlling for education in some studies (Glenn 1969). Also, recall from the experimental 
studies that the less educated were more likely to offer opinions on standard forms but not on 
filtered forms. Conflicting evidence related to these characteristics is probably due in large 
part to the fact that question content has also shown to be important for explaining no opinion 
responding. Generally, no opinion responses increase as topics move from everyday 
experience to topics that are removed from the everyday life of the respondents (Ferber 1966; 
Converse 1970; Converse 1976-77). 
Nonetheless, experiments and non-experiments have established that certain 
characteristics of respondents might predispose them to the use of no opinion options under 
certain circumstances. Some of these relationships are undesirable, but others actually lend 
validity to no opinion options. For example, we would expect those with less information 
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and interest in a topic to choose the no opinion option and probably prefer that these 
respondents choose the no opinion option most of the time. However, another source of no 
opinion responding is related to the measurement error caused by the construction of the 
survey instrument. 
Several studies have shown that item ambiguity is a significant source of no opinion 
responding. In fact, most studies show that there are two components to no opinion answers: 
ambivialence and non-opinion states (Brim 1955; Coombs and Coombs 1976; Faulkenberry 
and Mason 1978; Feick 1989). It is clear that no opinion can be used as an error response 
when the respondent is unclear about how to answer a question. Scalogram analysis has 
shown that item ambiguity has two possible sources (Coombs and Coombs 1976). In some 
cases item ambiguity is caused by inadequate question wording, response options, or 
instructions. Other times item ambiguity is caused by equivocation or ambivalence on behalf 
of the respondent. Ambivalence can occur even if the question is clear and the respondent 
has given thought to the question (Brim 1955; Feick 1989). Similarly, Coombs and Coombs 
(1976) report that equivocation occurs when a person's attitude is close to an item's "cut 
point," but the respondent is unable to decide how to answer. These ambivalent respondents 
are likely to fall in the middle on a Likert type scale (Feick 1989) or they might also use no 
opinion response as a temporary answer while they search for their real position on an issue 
(Bradburn and Sudman 1988). 
The results of the experiments establish that no opinion filters do alter response 
behavior and the results from nonexperimental studies reveal that there might be some 
common causes and correlates of no opinion responses. Filters might clear the analysis of 
some undesirable respondents, but it is also likely that some desirable respondents are also 
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filtered out. Given these results one might wonder whether this variation in response 
behavior and reduction in sample size affects data quality. That is, which form is better in 
terms of the accuracy of the measurements that are obtained? This question has been 
explored using different methods. 
One way to study this question is to probe no opinion responses. Gilljam and 
Granberg (1993) found that answers provided to follow-up questions by initial no opinion 
responders were significantly correlated with later behavior, such as voting. As expected, 
these correlations were weaker than those between actual vote and answers to an initial 
question, but this finding casts doubt on the assumption that everyone who initially said that 
they had no opinion initially, actually did not. However, Sanchez and Morchio (1992) found 
that respondents who are probed to answer questions, particularly knowledge questions, are 
answering with no more than guesswork as the nonatttiude reduction hypothesis suggests. 
Therefore probing or followup questions are not encouraged. This finding might have 
limited applicability to attitude questions where an initial no opinion could mean either lack 
of knowledge or uncertainty. Furthermore, the same study also showed that probing did not 
affect relationships between most variables. 
The question of accuracy can also be examined closely in factual questionnaires 
where it is possible to verify responses with known data sources. Poe et al. (1988) found that 
forms without don't know response options had the same error rate as forms with the don't 
know response. However, the don't know form provides significantly fewer useable 
responses for analysis, thus calling into question the use of filters. 
Structural equation modeling has been used to assess the effect of no opinion filtering 
on reliability and validity of substantive responses. The results from these studies are mixed. 
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A meta-analysis by Andrews (1984) of both factual and attitude survey items has shown that 
the inclusion of an explicit don't know was associated with higher validity, lower method 
effects, and lower residual error. Others have found evidence in the opposite direction. For 
example, some studies have found that filters usually have no effect on reliability coefficients 
and actually decrease the reliability of measurement in some cases (McClendon and Alwin 
1993; Alwin and Krosnick 1991). 
Differences between DK and NO responses 
There is a dearth of research examining whether respondents in self administered mail 
surveys distinguish between using don't know and no opinion responses or vary in their 
propensity to choose each. Previous split-ballot experiments have been mainly focused on 
telephone interviewing, where the major distinction is between full filters and quasi filters. 
The major emphasis in these studies was on varying the severity of the full filters. 
Some research has attempted to distinguish between the two different opinion states. 
Unfortunately, the two options are often given different meanings. These efforts have mostly 
focused on one or the other being defined as an ambivalent opinion state and the other as a 
non-opinion state. 
Faulkenberry and Mason (1978) focused on differences between don't know (non-
opinion) and no opinion (ambivalent) responses and found that useful distinctions exist 
between the two responses. They trained interviewers to listen for differences between don't 
know and no opinion responses. Responses were coded as no opinion when an item, "... had 
meaning for the respondent, but the respondent was ambivalent or undecided which 
attitudinal or opinion response to give" (p. 536). Responses were coded as don't know when 
the item "... represented a nonattitude — an interviewer's judgment that the item had no 
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particular meaning to the respondent" (p.536). Approximately 45% of these responses were 
coded as no opinion and 55% as don't know. The results of the study revealed some 
differences between don't know and no opinion response groups. People who answered 
don't know made less use of mass media, were less knowledgeable, and had a lower level of 
education. Based on these findings, Faulkenberry and Mason concluded that, "... 
nonexistent and ambivalent opinion groups should be distinguished from one another 
empirically and that both opinion states should be allowed to play their respective roles in 
social science models" (p.542). 
On the other hand, Smith (1984) measured no opinion, not sure/it depends, and don't 
know. He operationalized no opinion as "not having an opinion," not sure/it depends as 
"ambivalent,' and don't know as being similar to a "not sure/it depends" answer. In other 
words, the don't know response represented ambivalence rather than the absence of opinion. 
His study found 61% of nonsubstantive responses were of the no opinion variety, 34% were 
not sure, and 5% were don't know responses. 
Measurement of a middle position 
Middle position responding has the potential to be closely related to don't know and 
no opinion responding. Similar to don't know or no opinion responding, middle responding 
is also often attributed to ambivalence (Bishop 1987; Klopfer and Madden 1988). Some 
authors presume that ambivalent no opinion or don't know responders would be likely to 
choose a middle option on a likert scale (Brim 1955; Feick 1989). Previous research 
indicates, however that higher no opinion responding is not necessarily accompanied with 
greater use of a middle position (Schuman and Presser 1980). Also similar to don't know 
and no opinion options, the inclusion of a middle position increases the proportion of 
15 
respondents who choose this option (Presser and Schuman 1980; Bishop 1987; Kalton , 
Roberts, and Holt 1980). It has been shown, however, that increasing the number of 
alternative categories will prevent clustering in the middle (Presser and Schuman 1980) and 
that offering a middle position has little effect on other substantive categories when the 
opinions on an issue are well crystallized (Cantril 1946; Presser and Schuman 1980). 
Summary of Findings from the literature 
To summarize, this literature review highlights several findings from past research. 
• The use of no opinion filters is based on research about nonattitude holders 
responding to surveys. 
• Primarily these filters increase the proportion of people who will report that they have 
no opinion. 
• Respondents with low education and low involvement with issues seem to be 
predisposed to the use of no opinion response options although this evidence is 
contradictory at times. 
• Question content is also a factor in no opinion responses. 
• Some no opinion responses are caused by item ambiguity due to instrument error or 
ambivalence. 
• Some research has touched upon differences don't know and no opinion responses. 
However, the question of whether survey participants view these options differently, 
particularly with regard to self administered mail surveys, is an unexplored question 
in the literature. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY 
This chapter will outline two theoretical approaches that explain the use of no opinion 
filters: non-attitude reduction and satisficing. The non-attitude reduction hypothesis 
proposes that no-opinion filters discourage subjects from reporting attitudes about objects 
that they have not thought about. On the other hand, satisficing theory proposes that no 
opinion filters encourage respondents who do have attitudes not to complete the cognitive 
steps necessary to report them. 
Both of these theoretical perspectives focus on the measurement of attitudes. 
Throughout this thesis an attitude will refer to "the intensity of positive or negative affect for 
or against a psychological object" (Thurstone 1946). To report attitudes, survey respondents 
must undergo certain cognitive steps. Contemporary theories of survey response have 
identified four such steps: comprehension, retrieval, judgment, and response (Tourangeau, 
Rips, and Rasinski 2000: Schwarz and Bohner 2001). First, comprehension entails the 
respondent understanding the question and instructions on the survey. Next, in retrieval the 
respondent recalls all the relevant information related to the attitude object needed to answer 
the question. Third, the respondent makes an evaluative judgment based on this information. 
This judgment could be a negative or positive one, or the respondent might decide upon a 
neutral response. The last step is for the person to select the response option that best 
represents this attitude. This last stage might also include editing responses for such factors 
as social desirability (Schwarz and Bohner 2001). 
Respondents complete these stages with varying levels of effort. Certain attitude 
objects immediately elicit an attitude. Suppose someone who engages in bicycling 
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frequently is asked to report how satisfied they are with bicycling opportunities in their 
county. More than likely this person will have little difficulty answering such a question 
because they just need to recall their previous experience when performing this activity. 
Sometimes the issues that people are asked about do not immediately elicit an attitude. 
Reconsidering the bicycling example, suppose that a person who seldom or never engages in 
the activity is asked to report how satisfied they are with biking in their community. This 
person might have a much harder time reporting how they feel because of the dearth of 
information available to them. They might simply have never thought much about bicycling 
in their county. This person might have to recall information from years ago to make an 
evaluative judgment or they might attempt to consider second hand knowledge from 
conversations that they have had with others. In any case, this person would have a much 
harder time forming an evaluative judgment than a person who frequently engages in the 
activity. 
This latter example might be the case for many issues that people encounter in 
surveys. The nonattitude reduction and satisficing theoretical approaches differ in the degree 
to which they think that people should be encouraged to search for relevant information to 
provide survey responses to attitude items. 
Nonattitudes 
Research on the American electorate during the 1950's and 1960's illustrated that 
much of the American public had not given much thought to many of the issues asked about 
in public opinion surveys. Panel data from the 1956, 1958, and 1960 National Election 
Studies (NES) brought attention to this problem. Phillip Converse used this data to study the 
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stability of people's attitudes. He looked at two issues: attitude constraint and attitude 
consistency. 
Constraint refers to the consistency of a person's attitudes at one point in time and 
stems from the idea that certain attitudes are logically related to one another within a belief 
system. For example, someone who holds a favorable attitude towards the Republican Party 
should be in favor of the policies of the Republican Party. Constraint is measured by 
examining correlations between related attitudes. A highly constrained belief system will 
show highly correlated attitudes, whereas a belief system with a low level of constraint will 
show weak correlations between the same attitudes. High constraint is typical among elites 
and the well educated, whereas low constraint is typical of the mass public and less educated. 
Attitude consistency refers to the stability of a person's attitudes over time. It is best 
measured for a single group of people on a single issue at more than one point in time. Panel 
studies such as the NES allow a researcher to make such a measurement. Attitude 
consistency is then measured by looking at the correlation between time 1 and time 2 
attitudes for a single group of people. 
Some interesting findings emerged from the study of the panel data from the 1956, 
1958, and 1960 NES. Eight attitude items measured on five point Likert scales were the 
main focus of the research from this data. These items covered public policy issues such as 
civil rights, social welfare legislation, the relation of government to free enterprise, and 
foreign aid. Low correlations were found between the same attitudes for the same people at 
different time points in the range of .23 to .46 over two year intervals (Converse 1964; 
Converse 1970). It was thought to be unlikely that these low correlations were due to true 
attitude change for three reasons. First, the marginal percentages for the attitude items were 
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steady. This means that the percentage changing from pro to con almost exactly equaled the 
percentage that changed from con to pro for a particular attitude item. If true attitude change 
were occurring one would presume that a shift would occur in one direction. Second, items 
were chosen that would not be prone to short term shifts in attitudes during the course of the 
panel. In general, the items that showed the most instability were items that were most 
remote from a person's everyday experience. Last, the four-year correlations were nearly the 
same as the two-year correlations (see Figure 1). It was suggested that the only "true attitude 
change" model that could explain this change is one where some individuals take one 
position at Time 1, intentionally take the opposite position at Time 2, and return to their 
original position at Time 3. However, in the end a more plausible measurement error model 
was proposed. 
Figure 1. Example of two-year and four-year correlations found 
in the NES panel data (Reproduced from Converse 1964). 
To explain the pattern shown in figure 1, Converse proposed what is called the black 
and white model. This model divides respondents into two groups: a random group and a 
stable group. The major assumption of this model is that there is no true attitude change 
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between 1956 and 1958. Therefore, the individuals who changed their opinions during this 
time period were actually people who did not hold genuine opinions. These individuals were 
more or less randomly choosing response options. The remaining stable respondents, those 
who expressed the same opinion in both 1956 and 1958, are divided into two subgroups. The 
first subgroup is the true attitude holders who should show a nearly perfect correlation 
between their attitudes in 1958 and 1960. The second subgroup consists of the remaining 
individuals who by chance chose the same response option in both 1956 and 1958. This 
subgroup should show a correlation of nearly zero between 1958 and 1960. The correlation 
between 1958 and 1960 attitudes is then an average of these two groups of respondents. 
This random responding is disconcerting for researchers. It draws attention to the 
notion that not everyone has enough information or interest in an attitude item to provide 
stable responses. Interestingly, this lack of information or interest does not stop many 
individuals from providing responses. Many respondents with little or no information about 
particular questions provided responses to the NES attitude items even though elaborate 
screening procedures were used to screen out such individuals.l Why is this? The 
nonattitudes theoretical approach proposes that many respondents approach the survey 
interview as an intelligence test where don't know, no opinion, and uncertain responses are 
viewed as confessions of mental incapacity (Converse 1970). Moreover, many standard data 
collection procedures such as probing respondents in telephone or face to face interviews 
1 Respondents were read the following statement prior to the asking of the battery of items used by Converse: 
"... different things are important to different people, so we don't expect everyone to have an opinion about all 
of these things" (Converse 1970: 171). In addition, respondents were explicitly asked if they had an opinion for 
each item.. They question was asked only if the respondent reported that he had an opinion. Those who took 
this invitation not to respond are referred to as confessed nonattitudes by Converse. There is no distinction 
between nonattitude holders and confessed nonattitude holders. 
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encourage respondents provide responses to questions for which they have given little 
thought. 
Originally (Converse 1964;1970) it was suggested that nonatttitude holders respond 
in an equiprobable random manner by flipping a mental coin to select between response 
options. Later, this suggestion was revised to incorporate the idea that nonattitude holders 
might also resort to response sets (Converse 1974). Therefore, the distribution can take many 
different forms. Table 1 summarizes some of the most common forms as suggested by Smith 
(1984). Smith further notes that nonattitude holders might utilize any one of these strategies 
and indeed probably utilize a number of them over the course of a survey. 
Table 1. Possible response patterns of hidden nonattitudes. 
Pattern Description 
Equiprobable "flip mental coin" no effect on distribution of substantive 
responses 
Playing it safe Clustering of responses in the middle 
Positivity response set Increased selection of positive responses 
Social desirability Respondents guess the answer of the majority or that the 
interviewer wants 
Imputed understanding Impute meaning from a previous question or a generalized 
attitude 
The first pattern is the equiprobable random pattern originally suggested by Converse 
(1964;1970). Here the nonattitude holder randomly selects a response alternative. One 
would expect the distribution of responses to be unaffected by respondents as the categories 
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should show equal numbers of nonattitude holders. However, one would expect these 
individuals to add noise to interitem correlations. 
The playing-it-safe alternative suggests that nonattitude holders will tend to migrate 
towards the middle category. Ferber (1956) found that uniformed and misinformed 
respondents tend to provide answers to attitude items, but they also tend to cluster near the 
middle of attitude scales. Brim (1955) suggests that when respondents are asked to report an 
attitude, they are really being asked to report their "feelings based on probability expectations 
about the instrumental or end value of certain states of affairs in terms of individual 
satisfaction" (Brim 1955: 72). When respondents have little or no information about whether 
the attitude object is good or bad for them, the respondents tend to choose intermediate 
categories. Brim calls this the "equiprobable with ignorance principle." A follow-up 
intensity question should reveal that the respondent has relatively weak feelings about the 
attitude object. Respondents who answer on the extremes of attitude scales should show high 
intensity on the followup question. 
The positivity response set proposes that nonattitude holders will prefer positive over 
negative responses. This pattern implies that nonattitude holders will inflate the number of 
positive attitude holders. Berg and Rappaport (1954) attribute this to a cultural bias to 
accentuate the positive. 
Others (Phillips and Clancy 1972) suggest that nonattitude holders might also try to 
provide socially desirable answers. These are difficult to actually track down since one has to 
first identify the socially desirable answer. The socially desirable answer can be based on 
different sources of information. For example, it might be based on cues from the 
interviewer or a person's perception of how the majority might answer. 
23 
The last strategy that might be employed by respondents is the imputed meaning 
strategy. This can take two forms. First, the respondent might impute meaning from a 
previous question in a survey. Second, the respondent might answer based on a more 
generalized attitude. Schuman and Presser (1980) found that there is a fine line between 
attitudes and nonattitudes. That is, respondents who appear to be answering randomly are 
actually basing their response on a global attitude. For example, they found that people 
based their attitude towards the obscure 1979 Monetary Control Act on global views toward 
the problem of inflation. This finding also explains why split-ballot experiments sometimes 
reveal stronger inter-item correlations in an unfiltered condition. This strategy introduces 
correlated measurement error rather than random error as suggested by the equiprobable 
response strategy. 
Converse suggests that attitude strength is important for distinguishing between 
attitudes and nonattitudes. Attitude strength can be described on a continuum called 
centrality. Attitude objects at the high end of this continuum represent issues on which the 
person is informed and feels strongly about. In contrast, attitude objects of low centrality 
evoke nonattitudes. 
The strength dimension of centrality as Converse defines it consists of two separate, 
but related components: motivational and cognitive. In the first case, motivational centrality 
refers to "...the degree to which the object gears into the primary goal or need-structures of 
the individual" (Converse 1970: 181). It is difficult to operationalize this component of 
centrality as it requires identification of an individuals needs structure to show how an 
attitude object relates to the needs of an individual. However, motivational centrality is 
closely tied to the concept of ego involvement in the social judgment involvement approach. 
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Sherif and Sherif (1969) illustrate that the structure of an attitude can viewed as 
configurations of latitudes of acceptance and rejection. That is, for any issue a person will 
find positions that they can accept and positions that they reject. They further argue that 
individuals who are ego-involved or feel more intensely about an issue have larger latitudes 
of rejection and smaller latitudes acceptance. 
Cognitive centrality refers to the amount of thinking about an attitude object. 
Converse defines it as the "... proportion of mental time which is occupied by attention to the 
attitude-object over substantial periods" (Converse 1970: 182). This concept can easily be 
operationalized as the level of information that one has about the attitude object (Schuman 
1996). High cognitive centrality means that a respondent has a great deal of stored 
information about the attitude object. More importantly this information exists prior to and 
independent from the stimulus of the attitude item. Therefore the respondent has a readily 
available answer to the attitude question. 
Schuman and Presser (1981) describe crystallized attitudes as attitudes that exist prior 
to measurement and are reliable over time. The purpose for measuring the centrality of an 
attitude object for a person, therefore is to ask some indication about the amount of 
information one has concerning or the amount of thinking one has done regarding an attitude 
object. Researchers then can understand how stable responses are likely to be over time. 
An important implication of the centrality concept is that respondents are not 
members of all issue publics. The nonattitudes theoretical approach emphasizes that 
"different controversies excite different people" (Converse 1964). Therefore, some issues 
are more salient to some respondents compared to others. Understanding- centrality allows a 
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researcher to consider only members of particular issue publics when explaining survey 
results. 
Briefly, centrality can also be related back to the idea of constraint. Converse (1964) 
argues that ends should be more central to a belief system than means. For example, a 
person's attitude towards a policy issue (end) should be more central than their attitude 
toward a political party (mean). This proportion implies that people choose political parties 
that agree with their central political ideas or attitudes. Presumably a person would change to 
a different political party if their current party took a contrary position on a central issue. 
However, if the party itself holds a more central position in a person's belief system, then a 
person might change their views accordingly with the party. The main idea is that the most 
central element is the least likely to change and thus the most stable over time. 
Empirical Support 
One attitude item from the NES panel data was a near perfect fit for the black and 
white model. This was an item about the roles of private enterprise and government in areas 
like housing and electric power.2 The correlation between 1956 attitudes and 1958 attitudes 
on this item was .235. The correlation between 1958 and 1960 attitudes should be divided 
into two subgroups according to the black and white model. First, the random group, those 
that changed sides on this issue from 1956 to 1958, should show a correlation of zero 
between 1958 and 1960. Second, those who were consistent in their positions between 1956 
and 1958 should show a correlation of .47. It was found that the actual figures were .004 for 
the random group and .49 for the stable group. 
2 The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle. 
(1=agree strongly, 2=agree but not very strongly, 3=not sure, it depends, 4=disagree but not very strongly, 
5=disagree strongly, 8=Don't know, 9=NA, 7=no opinion) 
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In the end, the black and white model suggested that more than 80 percent of the 
sample had meaningless opinions regarding the power and housing item (Converse 1964). 
These meaningless opinions based on random responses are referred to as nonattitudes. In 
addition to these random responses, 35 percent of respondents took advantage of screening 
procedures by admitting that they didn't have an opinion during at least one wave of data 
collection. These respondents are referred to as confessed nonattitudes. Converse makes no 
distinction between nonattitudes and confessed nonattitudes. They are a homogenous group 
of nonattitude. holders. 
The results from this power and housing item are the main piece of evidence to verify 
the plausibility of the black and white model. Converse argues that to test the black and 
white model one needs an issue where some people have unwavering attitudes and others 
have no attitudes at all. He asserts that the power and housing item meets three further 
criteria. First, it involved a basic political controversy where those who understood the items 
ideological implication (private enterprise vs. government) would not be easily moved from 
their position. Second, few events were occurring at the time that would change a persons 
view. Third, the relationships (private enterprise vs. government) being judged in the item 
were abstract enough to be remote from the everyday experience of most individuals 
(Converse 1964: 243). 
The remaining seven items are described as "near fits" for the black and white model. 
In short, it was suggested that the other issues showed face content and time correlations 
which suggested that they would not be a good fit. Mainly, the items showed evidence that 
more individuals were actually undergoing true attitude change (Converse 1964: 244). 
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Despite this finding, the random groups' correlation for the other items departed from zero, 
but seldom more than .09 (Converse 1970; 175). 
The split-ballot experiments in Chapter 2 provide sound evidence that nonattitudes 
are prevalent on certain issues. These studies indicate that many people will opt for a no 
opinion option if it is offered. Consequently, they also reveal that respondents will oblige the 
researcher by answering questions that they know little about on a standard form. 
More recently, response latency studies have shown that individuals who take longer 
to respond in a survey more easily change their positions on issues. This finding indicates 
that some people lack crystallized attitudes and are constructing answers on the spot rather 
than giving thought prior to being asked a question (Bassili and Fletcher 1991). 
Criticism of the nonattitudes hypothesis 
The nonattitude hypothesis has been criticized since it was first proposed. Some have 
argued that it is elitist to find that the average citizen is without attitudes because their 
attitudes are inconsistent or not expressed as intellectuals would express them (Lane 1962; 
Pierce and Rose 1974). 
Some have proposed that instrument unreliability is the true cause of nonattitudes 
(Pierce and Rose 1974; Achen 1975). Achen (1975) suggests the questions used in the NES 
are vague. Pierce and Rose (1974) suggest that respondents were unable to place their 
precise affect given the response options available to them in the NES. Converse counter 
argues by pointing out that the items were apparently not unreliable for all respondents. For 
example the stable respondents showed near perfect correlations between time periods. 
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Satisficing Theory 
Satisficing theory (Krosnick 1993) assumes the presence of attitude relevant 
knowledge, but recognizes the cognitive effort respondents must undertake to answer attitude 
questions. Satisficing theory divides respondents into optimizers who carefully delineate 
differences between responses on questions and satisficers who respond more rapidly to 
survey questions. Whether a respondent satisfices or optimizes depends on their ability, 
motivation, and the difficulty of the response task. The theory suggests that satisficing will 
be greatest under the conditions of high task difficulty, low respondent ability, and low 
respondent motivation. 
Conditions for satisficing and optimizing 
Certain response tasks are more difficult for respondents than others. Task difficulty 
can be assessed at each stage of the survey response process. First, questions that contain 
long explanations or words that are difficult to understand can be hard to interpret. Next, 
questions that require respondents to retrieve relatively inaccessible information will be more 
difficult. For example, questions that ask for information from five years ago pose more 
difficulty in retrieval than questions that ask for current information. Third, some judgment 
tasks are considered to be easier than others. A question that asks someone to rate their 
satisfaction with, bicycling for example, is easier than a question that asks a respondent to 
rank order their satisfaction with 10 recreation activities. Last, the response task itself can be 
more difficult. . Scales with all points labeled will be easier to respond to than scales with 
only labels on the endpoints. 
Respondent ability also varies in surveys. Respondents are likely to differ in their 
ability to retrieve information, form a summary judgment, and express it on a survey. 
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Respondents who are more efficient at this process are likely to be optimizers. This aspect of 
respondent ability is frequently operationalized with educational attainment. Another aspect 
of respondent ability is the degree to which the respondent has preformed opinions about the 
objects asked about in the questionnaire. Individuals with crystallized opinions (Schuman 
and Presser 1981) are more likely optimize. 
Last, respondents differ in their motivation to answer questions. People might be 
more motivated to answer questions that are more personally important to them. If one is 
concerned about recreational opportunities available to them, for example, they are more 
likely to expend effort answering questions about these opportunities in their area. Also, 
respondents who think that a survey is important and will be applied to produce desired 
social outcomes are more likely to optimize when answering questions. Last, motivation is 
expected to decrease towards the end of the questionnaire. 
Forms of satisficing 
Satisficing response behavior can be either weak or strong. Weak satisficing entails 
the respondent haphazardly choosing response options. The respondent still performs the 
necessary steps to answer a question but does not fully complete each step. For example, a 
weak satisficer might not search memories sufficiently or integrate the information carefully. 
Strong satisficers, on the other hand, might skip entire stages of the response process. For 
instance they might skip retrieval and judgment altogether. 
Weak satisficing can take many forms. One form of weak satisficing is agreeing with 
the first response alternative that is reasonable. In mail or web surveys weak satisficers are 
likely to choose response options early in the list. This is known as a primacy effect. In 
other modes of data collection, such as telephone and face to face interviews, respondents are 
30 
likely to choose alternatives mentioned later in the list. This type of effect is referred to as a 
recency effect. Another form of weak satisficing is agreeing with assertions. This is more 
commonly known as acquiescence bias where respondents tend to agree with any statement 
presented to them. This can be a weak form of satisficing if the respondent only retrieves 
reasons for why he or she should agree with the statement rather than also thinking of reasons 
for disagreeing. 
Several response behaviors can exemplify strong satisficing. First, don't know 
responding is likely to foster strong satisficing. Answering don't know requires no retrieval 
or judgment. The presence of a don't know legitimizes this option and therefore encourages 
strong satisficing. Second, strong satisficers will be prone to endorse the status quo when it 
is offered. While some respondents do this after careful consideration, satisificers perform 
this task without any retrieval or judgment. Third, in the case where there is no status quo, 
satisficers are likely to flip mental coins and randomly choose among response options. Last, 
strong satisficers might be haphazard when responding to rating scales. Optimizers carefully 
differentiate between a series of items presented in rating scales. That is, they carefully rate 
the items from best to worst. satisficers on the other hand will examine the first item and 
find an acceptable response which will then be applied to the other items in the list. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS 
Background 
This research is part of a community planning survey undertaken by The Dallas 
County Conservation Board (DCCB) located in Perry, Iowa. The DCCB manages ten parks 
and recreation areas. In 2003, it began a strategic planning discussion- regarding conservation 
and recreation services available to Dallas County residents. The board decided to collect 
input from citizens regarding their awareness and use of services and facilities, ideas about 
future changes or improvements, and views on conservation programming. 
The DCCB requested technical assistance from the Community Development-Data 
Information and Analysis Laboratory (CD-DIAL) in February of 2003. CD-DIAL is a 
.primary data collection unit operated by Extension Sociology at Iowa State University that 
provides training and technical assistance to complete community surveys. CD-DIAL 
provided technical assistance with questionnaire design, data collection, and report writing. 
Dallas County is geographically located in central Iowa and has a population of 
40,750. It is adjacent to Polk County, which is the state's most populous county and home to 
the capitol, Des Moines. Dallas County has been a part of the Des Moines Metropolitan 
Statistical Area since 1983. Much of the county however, is considered rural as thirteen out 
of the seventeen incorporated places had a population of fewer than 2,500 persons at the 
2000 Census. The most populated places in the county are located near the border with Polk 
County. One fifth (19%) of adult residents are 18-29 years of age, two thirds (66%) are 30-
64 years of age, and one sixth (16%) are age 65 or older. Two thirds (65%) of the county's 
adult residents are married. More than one half (57%) have completed at least some college. 
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Methodology 
The DCCB in collaboration with CD-DIAL developed aself-administered 13-page 
questionnaire. The questionnaire covers two major topics. The first topic was respondents' 
views on recreation and leisure opportunities. The second topic was respondents' views on 
conservation issues. The questionnaire was pre-tested on a group of 30 residents to refine the 
survey questions. 
Sampling 
The sample consisted of adults living in Dallas County. The sampling frame 
consisted roughly of households with addresses in Dallas County. A total of 972 households 
were randomly selected to receive the questionnaire. A sample of this size was chosen 
because it would have been large enough to achieve a 95% level of confidence with a margin 
of error of +/-5%. American Consumer Lists in Omaha, Nebraska compiled the random 
sample and the sampling frame from which the sample was selected. 
Data Collection 
A three-step data collection procedure, recommended by Dillman (1978: 2000), was 
followed to maximize response to the survey. First, a cover letter, copy of the questionnaire, 
and return envelope (to Iowa State University) were mailed to all selected residents. The 
cover letter specified that an adult male or female in the household should complete the 
questionnaire. Two weeks after the first mailing, all selected residents received a postcard to 
thank them if they had returned a completed questionnaire and remind them of the 
importance of the study to the county if they had not reported. Third, approximately two 
weeks after the postcard mailing, a second cover letter, questionnaire, and return envelope 
were mailed to those who did not respond to the first two mailings. Responses were tracked 
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throughout data collection to determine who had responded. The Human Subjects Review 
Committee at Iowa State University approved this tracking system, along with the entire 
survey methodology. A fourth mailing including a certified letter to nonresponders is 
recommended by Dillman (1978; 2000) however, it was not utilized due to cost 
considerations. 
Response Rate 
As shown in Table 2, 393 completed questionnaires were returned from respondents 
in the random sample. An additional 35 questionnaires were returned due to insufficient 
addresses or because the persons had moved with no available forwarding address. Another 
five persons were deceased. Three persons lived outside the geographic area of the study. 
Last, 536 persons either refused or reported that they were. unable to complete the 
questionnaire. The adjusted response rate therefore, equaled 42%. Although this response 
rate is below what one would like to see from a survey sample the demographic 
characteristics of the sample closely match the county demographics at the 2000 Census.3
Table 2. Final disposition of questionnaires. 
Disposition Number
l.Questionnaires returned 393 
2.Refusals 535 
3.Undeliverable 27 
4.Moved with no forwarding address 8 
S.Deceased 5 
6.Live outside geographic area of the 3 
survey 
7.Physically unable to complete form 1 
Total Mailed 972 
3 However, the sample underrepresents less educated, younger, and lower income respondents. The sample 
includes 28% of respondents with a high school diploma or less, whereas the 2000 Census reports that 43% 
have the same level of education. The sample includes 6% of respondents age 18-29, whereas the 2000 Census 
reports that 19% are in the same age group. The median 2002 household income for the sample is $58,000, 
whereas the median 1999 income for the 2000 Census is $48,528. 
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Experimental design 
The study incorporated asplit-ballot experimental design. This design included three 
different forms of the questionnaire. The only difference between the forms was the 
manipulation of response categories for a series of 5-point Likert-type items regarding 
recreational facilities and activities. These items were located near the middle of the 
questionnaire. Respondents were first asked about their level of satisfaction with seventeen 
different recreational facilities and activities. Next, they were asked a policy question about 
whether they thought the activities or facilities should receive less funding or more funding 
in the future. As shown in Table 3, the first form included only the 5-point Likert scale, the 
second form includes the Likert scale plus a `no opinion' option, and the third form included 
the Likert scale plus a `don't know' option. The first form, which omitted a no opinion or 
don't know option will be referred to as the standard form. Residents selected for the sample 
were randomly assigned to three equal groups with each group including 324 residents. As 
noted previously, the overall response rate for the survey was 42%. The response rates for 
each of the three forms did vary. The response rate for the standard form was 37% versus 
45% for the no opinion form and 45% for the don't know form. 
Table 3. Summary of experimental design. 
Form 
Standard 
No opinion 
Don't know 
Response Options 
Satisfaction items 
5 point Likert scale 
5 point Likert scale with no 
opinion option 
5 point Likert scale with don't 
know option 
Policy items 
5 point Likert scale 
5 point Likert scale with no opinion 
option 
5 point Likert scale with don't 
know option 
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Data Analysis 
The analysis strategy was to compare response patterns across the three forms of the 
questionnaire. The analyses were conducted in two stages. First, analysis of variance was 
used to examine respondents' use of various response options on each of the three forms. 
Three hypotheses were examined at this stage of the analysis. The first two hypotheses were 
suggested by the nonattitudes literature, which suggests that respondents will feel pressure to 
provide a response to survey questions, particularly in situations where they are not given the 
opportunity to opt out of the question through a filter (Converse 1970). Thus we expected 
that respondents on the standard form would report more positive or negative responses than 
respondents on the no opinion or don't know forms. In addition, respondents on the standard 
form should be more likely to select the middle option than respondents on the no opinion 
and don't know form (Brim 1955; Ferber 1956; Smith 1984). These two hypotheses are 
stated below. 
H1: Respondents who complete the standard form are more likely to provide positive 
or negative responses than are respondents who completed the no opinion and don't 
know forms. 
H2: Respondents who complete the standard form are more likely to provide middle 
responses than are respondents who complete the no opinion and don't know forms. 
Another hypothesis addresses the question of whether a no opinion or don't know 
option are different from one another. The research design of this thesis allows for an 
examination of don't know and no opinion response options in the context of two different 
types of questions. First, questions that appeal to a respondent's direct experience with an 
attitude object should be more likely to elicit a don't know response as an expression of 
ignorance when respondents do not have any experience with the attitude object. In contrast, 
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questions for which one does not need any direct experience to answer should elicit more no 
opinion responses than don't know responses. 
Policy questions do not require one to have any direct experience with an attitude 
object. It can be argued for example that one only needs to be a member of the community to 
hold such an opinion. In any case, the threshold for knowledge on a policy question should 
be much lower than a satisfaction question. Therefore, it is logical that more people would 
prefer to claim no opinion without necessarily admitting ignorance. 
H3: Respondents will be more likely to choose the don't know option than the no 
opinion option for satisfaction items. 
H4: Respondents will be more likely to choose the no opinion option than the don't 
know option for the policy items. 
The second stage of the analysis utilizes information about the respondents' cognitive 
state to classify them into different classes of respondents. Nonattitudes and satisficing are 
suggestive of different patterns with regard to the respondents' cognitive state and the use of 
don't know or no opinion response options. Cognitive state-response outcome mapping 
(Beatty and Hermann 1995; 2002) can be used to present the relationship between what a 
respondent knows about an attitude object and how they respond to a survey question about 
that object. This framework for assessing no opinion and don't know options was proposed 
by Beatty and Hermann (1995; 2002) and is shown below in Figure 2. 
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Available 
Information can 
be retrieved with 
minimal effort 
Substantive 
Response 
Accessible 
Information can 
be retrieved with 
effort or prompts 
Generatable 
Information is not 
know but can be 
estimated 
Item 
nonresponse 
Inestimable 
Information is not 
known/no basis 
for estimating 
Figure 2. Beatty and Hermann's four-state mapping of cognitive states to response 
outcomes (reproduced from Beatty and Hermann 2002) 
This mapping proposes four cognitive states and two possible response outcomes. In 
the first cognitive state, the information needed to answer a survey question can be easily 
retrieved. In the accessible cognitive state the respondent has the information, but needs to 
be probed in order to retrieve it. In the generatable cognitive state the information is not 
known, but it can be estimated by the respondent. In the inestimable cognitive state the 
needed information is not known and there is no possibility for the respondent to estimate it. 
Respondents with any of these cognitive states might choose either a substantive response or 
item nonresponse. 
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The paths between the cognitive states and response outcomes can be labeled as a 
potentially truthful response, error of commission, or error of omission (see Table 4). For 
example, the path between the available cognitive state and a substantive response represents 
a potentially truthful response in that one has information and is capable of providing a 
truthful response. It could also be an error of commission if someone intentionally reports a 
dishonest answer. The path from the available cognitive state to item nonresponse represents 
an error of omission. This path can only be an error of omission because it is known that the 
respondent has available information, .but does not report it. 
Table 4. Response paths in Beatty and Hermann's mapping. 
Respondent's cognitive state Response outcome Response path 
Available Substantive response T,C 
Available Item nonresponse O 
Accessible Substantive response T,C 
Accessible Item nonresponse T,O 
Generatable Substantive response T,C 
Generatable Item nonresponse T,O 
Inestimable Substantive response C 
Inestimable Item nonresponse T 
T=Potentially truthful response 
O=Potential error of omission 
C=Potential error of commision 
A simple two state mapping was used for this stage of analysis (see figure 3). For this 
mapping the respondent either has knowledge or does not have knowledge about the attitude 
object. These two cognitive states are analogous to Beatty and Hermann's available and 
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inestimable states.4 Four response outcomes are .possible in the mappin a ositive or g p 
negative response, middle response, no opinion/don't now response or item nonresponse. 
Does not have 
knowledge 
Has not 
participated in the 
activity in the past 
12 months 
Has knowledge 
Participated in the 
activity within the 
past 12 months 
Positive or 
negative 
response 
Middle 
response 
No opinion or 
don't know 
response 
Item 
nonresponse 
Figure 3. Maitland's two cognitive state response outcome mapping. 
As shown in Table 5, overall there are 8 (2 X 4) possible response paths in this 
mapping. From the mapping, someone who has knowledge and reports a positive or negative 
attitude is logically expressing a true attitude. A respondent who has knowledge and 
a The middle two cognitive states (accessible and inestimable) are left out of this mapping mainly because the 
experiment was conducted in the middle of a survey that was paid for by a client. Determining whether 
someone is in the middle two cognitive states would have required follow-up items for every activity asked 
about in the questionnaire. This would have been burdensome for the respondent by adding substantial length 
to the survey. There is also some dispute about whether respondents can actually report their own cognitive 
states (see Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Feldman and Lynch 1988). 
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provides a middle response is expressing either ambivalence or item ambiguity. A 
respondent who has knowledge about an attitude object and does not provide any response is 
a refusal. 
The remaining response paths can be classified in terms of nonattitudes and 
satisficing. Satisficing occurs when someone has attitude relevant knowledge, but circles a 
no opinion or don't know response option. Two response paths show hidden nonattitudes. 
The first case of a hidden nonattitude occurs when someone does not have knowledge about 
an attitude object and reports a positive or negative attitude. A second case of a hidden 
nonattitude is when someone does not have knowledge and circles a middle response. True 
nonattitudes are shown when someone who does not have knowledge either chooses not to 
provide any answer or circles a no opinion or don't know response. 
Table 5. Response paths in Maitland's two state mapping. 
Respondent's Cognitive State 
Has knowledge 
Has knowledge 
Has knowledge 
Has knowledge 
Doesn't have knowledge 
Doesn't have knowledge 
Doesn't have knowledge 
Doesn't have knowledge 
Response Outcome 
Positive or negative 
Middle 
Item nonresponse 
Don't know or No opinion 
Positive or negative 
Middle 
Item nonresponse 
Don't know or no opinion 
Response path 
True response 
Ambivalent attitude 
Refusal 
S ati sficin~g 
Hidden nonattitude 
Hidden nonattitude 
True nonattitude 
True nonattitude 
The analysis strategy was to estimate the mean use of each response path for all three 
forms. Analysis of variance with a Bonferonni post- hoc test was then used to test for 
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differences in the use of each path between the forms. Satisficing perspective suggests two 
additional hypotheses. 
H5: Respondents who complete the no opinion and don't know forms will give a 
significant number of satisficing responses. That is, respondents who have attitude 
relevant knowledge will be more likely to select don't know or no opinion when it is 
offered. 
H6: Respondents on the no opinion and don't know forms will report significantly 
fewer true responses than respondents on the standard form. 
The nonatttudes literature also suggests two more additional hypotheses. 
H7a: The standard form causes more hidden nonattitudes in the middle category than 
the no opinion and don't know forms. 
H7b: The standard form causes more hidden nonattitudes in the positive or negative 
categories than the no opinion and don't know forms. 
H8: More true nonattitudes will be reported on the no opinion and don't know forms 
than on the standard form. 
Measurement 
Knowledge about an attitude object is measured by asking respondents how often 
they have participated in several recreational activities in their county over the past 12 
months.s The response outcomes are the responses to two different sets of uestions. First, q 
respondents were asked about their level of satisfaction with the recreational activities.6 A 
5 The question reads as follows: "During the past 12 months, how often have you or other members of your 
household participated in the following activities at parks and recreation areas in Dallas County?" (1=Never, 
2=1-2 times, 3=3-4 times, 4=5 or more times) Each item is scored 0 if the respondent hasn't participated in the 
activity and 1 if the respondent participated in the activity at all. 
6 The question reads as follows: "How satisfied are you with the following activities and facilities at parks and 
recreation areas in Dallas County?" (1=Very dissatisfied, S=Very satisfied) 
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second series of items asked respondents express their funding preferences for the 
recreational activities. 
~ The question reads as follows: "In the future, should the following activities and facilities at parks and 
recreation areas in Dallas County receive less funding or more funding?"" (1=Much less funding, S=Much more 
funding) 
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CHAPTER 5 : ANALYSIS 
The analysis begins by examining the number of times that respondents selected 
various response options. Table 6 illustrates the mean number of times that respondents 
selected the response options for the ten satisfaction items by form. 
Table 6. Mean selection of satisfaction response options by question form. 
Standard No Opinion Don't Know 
Response Selection Form (n=115) Form (n=13 8) Form (n=140) 
Positive or negative 5.43 4.24 4.33 
Middle* 7.20 a 1.68 1.67 
No opinion or don't know* 4.37 a 10.27 9.41 
Item nonresponse* 4.37 a .81 1.59 
* ANOVA detected differences among the three forms, p<.05. Pair wise comparisons 
conducted using the Bonferroni post-hoc test. 
a There is a significant difference between the standard form and both the no opinion 
and don't know forms. 
Respondents differed in their propensity to select the middle option (F2, 390 = 60.33, 
p<.05). Respondents who were given the standard form chose the middle option an average 
of 7.20 times. Respondents given the no opinion form (M=1.68) were much less likely to 
circle the middle option. From the confidence interval, one can be 95% confident that, on 
average, respondents who completed the standard form chose the middle option 3.85 to 7.18 
more times than did respondents who completed the no opinion form.$ Likewise, one can be 
95% confident that, on average, respondents who completed the standard form chose the 
middle option 3.87 to 7.18 more times than respondents who completed the don't know form. 
s All confidence intervals calculated using a Bonferroni adjustment assuming unequal variances (a*=.05/3). 
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Respondents also differed in their propensity to item nonrespond between forms (F2, 
390 = 17.13, p<.05). Respondents on the standard form (M=4.37) chose not to answer more 
items than respondents on the no opinion form (M=.81) and don't know forms (M=1.59). 
The confidence interval reveals that one can be 95% confident that, on average, respondents 
on the standard form choose not to answer 1.89 to 5.24 more items than respondents on' the 
no opinion form. Similarly one can be 95% confident that, on average, respondents on the 
standard form chose not to answer .99 to 4.59 more items than respondents on the don't 
know form. In addition, no opinion and don't know responding is significantly greater than 
item nonresponse on the standard form (F2, 390 = 31.73, p<.OS). The 95% confidence interval 
indicates that, on average, respondents who completed the no opinion form chose the no 
opinion option 3.93 to 7.85 more items than respondents on the standard form chose not to 
answer. Similarly, on average, respondents who completed the don't know form chose the 
don't know option 3.08 to 7.00 more items than respondents on the standard form chose not 
to answer. 
Table 7 demonstrates respondents' propensity to select the available response options 
for the policy items. 
Table 7. Mean selection of policy response options by question form. 
Standard No Opinion Don't Know 
Response Selection Form (n=115) Form (n=13 8) Form (n=140) 
Positive or negative 7.44 6.11 5.69 
Middle* 6.46 a 2.48 2.74 
No opinion or don't know* 3.10 a 7.41 7.09 
Item nonresponse* 3.10 b 1.01 1.49 
* ANOVA detected differences between at least two of the three forms, p<.05. Pair 
wise comparisons conducted using the Bonferroni post-hoc test. 
a The standard form vs. the no opinion form is significant and the standard form vs. the 
don't know form is significant. 
b The standard form vs. the no opinion form is significant. 
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There is a significant difference in mean selection of the middle response for the 
policy items (F2, 390 = 27.95, p<.OS). Respondents given the standard form (M=6.46) of the 
questionnaire were significantly more likely to circle the middle option than respondents on 
the no opinion form (M=2.48) and don't know form (M=2.74). The confidence interval 
reveals that one can conclude with 95%confidence that, on average, respondents who 
completed the standard form circled the middle option between 2.37 and 5.60 more times 
than respondents who completed the no opinion form. One can also conclude with 95% 
confidence that, on average, respondents who completed the standard form circled the middle 
option 2.11 to 5.34 more times than respondents who completed the don't know form. 
There is also a significant difference in the amount item nonresponse between the 
three forms for the policy items (F2, 390 = 6.16, p<.OS). Respondents who completed the 
standard form (M=3.10) chose not to answer more questions than those who completed the 
no opinion (M=1.01) form. The confidence interval reveals that one can be 95%confident 
that, on average, respondents who completed the standard form chose not to answer .48 to 
3.70 more policy items than respondents on the no opinion form. The difference in item 
nonresponse between the standard form (M=3.10) and don't know form (M=1.49) was not 
significant. 
No opinion and don't know responding is also significantly greater than item 
nonresponse for the policy items on the standard form (F2, 390 = 15.46, p<.05). The 95% 
confidence interval indicates that, on average, respondents who completed the no opinion 
form chose the no opinion option for 2.33 to 6.29 more items than respondents on the 
standard form chose not to answer. Similarly, on average, respondents who completed the 
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don't know form chose the don't know option for 1.98 to 6.00 more items than respondents 
on the standard form chose not to answer. 
The second stage of the analysis used knowledge about the respondents' cognitive 
states to classify each respondent. Table 8 illustrates the respondents' use of the eight 
different response paths for the satisfaction items between the three forms of the 
questionnaire. 
Table 8. Mean use of response paths for satisfaction items. 
Standard No Opinion Don't Know 
Response Path Form (n=115) Form (n=13 8) Form (n=140) 
True response 1.99 2.25 2.48 
Ambivalent response* 1.16 a .73 .66 
Refusal .08 .07 .11 
Satisficin~-NO/DK* 0 b .83 .39 
Hidden nonattitude-+/-* 3.43 ~ 1.99 1.85 
Hidden nonattitude-middle* 6.03 ~ .95 1.01 
True nonattitude-nonresponse* 4.30 ~ .75 1.47 
True nonattitude-NO/DK* 4.30 ~ 9.44 9.02 
* ANOVA detected differences between at least two of the three forms, p<.05. Pair wise 
comparisons conducted using the Bonferroni post-hoc test. a The standard form vs. the don't know form is significant. b The standard form vs. the no opinion form is significant, the standard form vs. the don't 
know form is significant, and the no opinion form vs. the don't know form is 
slgnl icant. 
The standard form vs. the no opinion form is significant and the standard form vs. the 
don't know form is significant. 
Expression of ambivalence differed significantly (F2, 390 = 4.11, p<.OS) between the 
standard form (M=1.16) and the don't know form (M=.66). The 95% confidence interval 
around this difference in means is from .OS to .96. The lower bound of the confidence 
interval approaches zero, so this effect could be quite small. There was also a significant 
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difference for satisficing between the forms (F2, 390 = 21.38, p<.05). The effect appears to be 
somewhat larger for the no opinion form (M=.83) than the don't know form (M=.39). The 
confidence interval shows that one can be 95% confident the respondents who completed the 
no opinion form satisfice between .51 and 1.14 more times than respondents on the standard 
form. The same confidence interval for the difference in means between the standard form 
and don't know form is between .24 and .54. There is also a significant difference in 
satisficing between the no opinion and don't know forms for the satisficing items. The 
confidence interval explains that one can be 95 %confident that, on average, respondents 
who completed the no opinion form satisfice between .09 and .78 more times than 
respondents who completed the don't know form. These satisficing effects could be quite 
small as the lower limits of the confidence intervals approach zero. 
Hidden nonattitudes are more prevalent among the standard form satisfaction items. 
Significant differences between the forms are found for the number of hidden nonattitudes 
among the positive or negative categories (F2, 390 = 6.21, p<.OS). More of these types of 
hidden nonattitudes are likely to be found on the standard form (M=3.43) than the no opinion 
(M=1.99) and don't know (M=1.85) forms. The effect is slightly larger for the don't know 
form. With 95% confidence one can conclude that, on average, respondents who completed 
the standard form express hidden nonattitudes in the positive or negative categories 
between .27 and 2.90 more times than those who completed the don't know form satisfaction 
items. The same confidence interval for the no opinion form is from .10 to 2.80. 
Significant differences between the forms are also found for the number of hidden 
nonattitudes in the middle category among the satisfaction items (F2, 390 = 61.89, p<.OS). 
Once again, these types of hidden nonattitudes are more likely to be found on the standard 
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form (M=6.03) compared with the no opinion form (M=.95) and don't know form (M=1.01). 
In other words, both the no opinion and don't know forms significantly reduced these kinds 
of hidden nonattitudes. The 95% confidence interval reveals that, on average, respondents on 
the no opinion form report 3.57 to 6.60 less hidden nonattitudes in the middle category than 
those completed the standard form satisfaction items. The corresponding confidence interval 
for the difference between the standard form and don't know form illustrates that, on average, 
respondents report 3.48 to 6.58 less hidden nonattitudes in the middle category on the don't 
know form than the standard form. 
Respondents who completed the standard form (M=4.30) satisfaction items without 
attitude relevant experience are also more likely to be item nonresponders than respondents 
who completed either the no opinion (M=.75) or don't know (M=1.47) forms (F2, 390 = 18.23, 
p<.05). From the confidence interval, one can be 95% confident that respondents without 
attitude relevant experience on the standard form did not answer 1.90 to 5.19 more 
satisfaction items than similar respondents who completed the no opinion form. The 
corresponding confidence interval between the standard and don't know forms reveals that 
respondents without attitude relevant experience chose not to answer 1.06 to 4.58 more 
satisfaction items on the standard form compared to the don't know form. 
Among the other true nonattitude holders are also those who do not have attitude 
relevant experience and choose either a no opinion or don't know option. Use of the no 
opinion (M=9.44) and don't know (M=9.02) categories among respondents without attitude 
relevant experience is significantly different from item nonresponse (M=4.30) among similar 
respondents on the standard form (F2, 390 = 26.83, p<.05). The 95% confidence interval 
illustrates that, on average, respondents without attitude relevant experience that have a no 
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opinion option will select that option 3.23 to 7.06 more times than respondents without 
attitude relevant knowledge will choose not to respond without the option. Likewise, the 
95% confidence interval illustrates that, on average, respondents without attitude relevant 
experience who have a don't know option will select that option 2.80 to 6.65 more times than 
respondents without attitude relevant knowledge will choose not to respond without the 
option. 
Table 9 demonstrates the respondents' use of the eight different response paths for 
the policy items for the three forms of the questionnaire. Similar patterns to the satisfaction 
items emerge among the policy items. 
Table 9. Mean use of response paths for policy items. 
Standard No Opinion Don't Know 
Response Path Form (n=115) Form (n=13 8) Form (n=140) 
True response 1.97 ' 2.22 1.91 
Ambivalent response* 1.16 a .57 .89 
Refusal .11 .10 .19 
Satisficing-NO/DK* 0 b .99 .66 
Hidden nonattitude-+/-* 5.48 b 3.89 3.79 
Hidden nonattitude-middle* 5.30 b 1.91 1.85 
True nonattitude-nonresponse* 2.98 b .91 1.29 
True nonattitude-NO/DK* 2.98 b 6.41 6.42 
* ANOVA detected differences between at least two of the three forms, p<.05. Pair wise 
comparisons conducted using the Bonferroni post-hoc test. 
a The standard form vs. the no opinion form is significant. 
b The standard form vs. the no opinion form is significant and the standard form vs. the 
don't know form is significant. 
As shown in Table 9, expression of ambivalence for the policy items differed 
significantly (FZ 390 = 4.Zg, p<.OS) between the standard form (M=1.16) and the no opinion 
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form (M=.57). The 95% confidence interval explains that, on average, respondents who 
completed the standard form expressed .10 to 1.07 more ambivalent attitudes than 
respondents who completed no opinion form. There was also a significant difference for 
satisficing between the forms (F2~ 390 = 15.83, p<.OS). The effect appears to be somewhat 
larger for the no opinion form (M=.99) than the don't know form (M=.66). The confidence 
interval shows that one can be 95%confident that, on average, respondents on the no opinion 
form satisfice between .61 and 1.38 more times than respondents on the standard form. The 
same confidence interval for the difference in means between the standard form and don't 
know form is between .36 and .97. These effects could all be quite small as the lower limits 
of the confidence intervals approach zero. 
There are also significant differences between the forms regarding the number of 
hidden nonattitudes among the positive or negative categories (F2, 390 = 5.02, p<.OS). More of 
these types of hidden nonattitudes are likely to be found on the standard form (M=5.48) than 
either the no opinion (M=3.89) or don't know (M=3.79) forms. With 95% confidence one 
can conclude that, on average, the respondents express hidden nonattitudes in the positive or 
negative categories between .08 and 3.09 more times on the standard form policy items than 
the no opinion form policy items. Similarly, one can conclude that respondents on the 
standard form express .23 to 3.16 more hidden nonattitudes in the positive or negative 
categories on the standard form than the don't know form. 
Significant differences between the forms are also found for the number of hidden 
nonattitudes in the middle category (F2, 3~ = 27.84, p<.OS). Hidden nonattitudes are more 
likely to be found on the standard form (M=5.30) compared with the no opinion form 
(M=1.91) and don't know form (M=1.85). The 95% confidence interval explains that, on 
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average, respondents who completed the no opinion form report 1.94 to 4.84 less hidden 
nonattitudes in the middle category for the policy items. The corresponding confidence 
interval illustrates that respondents report 2.03 to 4.87 less hidden nonattitudes on the don't 
know form than the standard form. 
Respondents who completed the standard form (M=2.98) without attitude relevant 
experience are more likely to be item nonresponders than similar respondents who completed 
either the no opinion (M=.91) or don't know (M=1.29) forms (F2, 390 = 7.04, p<.05). From 
the confidence interval, one can be 95% confident that, on average, respondents without 
attitude relevant experience on the standard form did not answer .53 to 3.63 more policy 
items than similar respondents who completed the no opinion form. The corresponding 
confidence interval between the standard form and don't know form reveals that, on average, 
respondents without attitude relevant experience on the standard form chose not to 
answer .08 to 3.30 more policy items than respondents who completed the don't know form. 
There are also true nonattitude holders who select the no opinion or don't know 
option. Use of the no opinion (M=6.41) and don't know (M=6.42) categories among 
respondents without attitude relevant experience is significantly different from item 
nonresponse (M=2.98) among similar respondents on the standard form (F2, 390 = 12.25, 
p<.05). The 95% confidence interval illustrates that, on average, respondents without 
attitude relevant experience who have a no opinion option will select that option 1.57 to 5.28 
more times than respondents without attitude relevant knowledge will choose not to respond 
without the option. Likewise, the 95% confidence interval illustrates that, on average, 
respondents without attitude relevant experience who have a don't know option will select 
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that option 1.53 to 5.35 more times than respondents without attitude relevant knowledge 
will choose not to respond without the option. 
Summary of Support for Hypotheses 
Hl: Respondents who complete the standard form are more likely to provide positive or 
negative responses than are respondents who completed the no opinion and don't know 
forms. 
Not supported. The standard form did not significantly increase the number of 
positive or negative responses offered for either the satisfaction (see Table 6) or 
policy items (see Table 7) 
H2: Respondents who complete the standard form are more likely to provide middle 
responses than are respondents who complete the no opinion and don't know forms. 
Supported. Respondents who completed the standard form did circle the middle 
response significantly more often than respondents who completed either the no 
opinion and don't know forms. This was true for both the satisfaction (see Table 6) 
and policy items (see Table 7). 
H3: Respondents will be more likely to choose the don't know option than the no opinion 
option for satisfaction items. 
Not supported. No significant differences were found between the use no opinion or 
don't know response options (see Table 6). 
H4: Respondents will be more likely to choose the no opinion option than the don't know 
option for the policy items. 
Not supported. No significant differences were found between the use no opinion or 
don't know response options (see Table 7). 
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H5: Respondents who complete the no opinion and don't know forms will give a significant 
number of satisficing responses. That is, respondents who have attitude relevant knowledge 
will be more likely to select don't know or no opinion when it is offered. 
Supported. Respondents with knowledge who completed the no opinion and don't 
know forms did select the no opinion and don't know options significantly more often 
on both the satisfaction (see Table 8) and policy items (see Table 9). However, the 
lower bound of the confidence intervals approach zero indicating that the effect could 
be relatively small. 
H6: Respondents on the no opinion and don't know forms will report significantly fewer 
true responses than respondents on the standard form. 
Not supported. No differences were found in the number of true responses (responses 
from respondents with knowledge in the positive or negative categories) between 
forms for either the satisfaction (see Table 8) or policy items (see Table 9). 
H7a: The standard form causes more hidden nonattitudes in the middle category than the no 
opinion and don't know forms. 
Supported. Respondents without attitude relevant knowledge were significantly more 
likely to select the middle category on the standard form than the no opinion or don't 
know forms for both satisfaction (see Table 8) and policy items (see Table 9). 
H7b: The standard form causes more hidden nonattitudes in the positive or negative 
categories than the no opinion and don't know forms. 
Supported. Respondents without attitude relevant knowledge were significantly more 
likely to select the positive or negative categories on the standard form than the no 
opinion and don't know forms for both the satisfaction (see Table 8) and policy items 
(see Table 9). 
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H8: More true nonattitudes will be reported on the no opinion and don't know forms than on 
the standard form. 
Supported. More true nonattitudes were found on the no opinion and don't know 
forms for both satisfaction (see Table 8) and policy items (see Table 9). 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis explored two questions. First, will response patterns to self administered 
questionnaires differ depending on whether a no opinion or don't know filter is included as a 
response option? Second, are the changes in response patterns due to satisficing or 
nonattitudes? 
The results confirm that no opinion and don't know response options do effect 
response patterns. As suggested by the results of past research (Kalton, Collins, and Brook 
1978; Schuman and Presser 1979) both the no opinion and don't know options tend to 
increase the number of respondents who will admit that they do not have an opinion. That is, 
respondents tend to treat the option the same whether it is labeled no opinion or don't know. 
Similar results were also achieved for both the satisfaction (satisfaction with recreational 
activities) and policy (funding priorities of recreational activities) items here. 
Although, it appears as if more respondents will offer an opinion on a form without a 
no opinion or don't know option (standard form), many of the opinions offered on the 
standard form beyond those given on the filtered forms are middle responses. As past 
research indicates (Brim 1955; Ferber 1956; Converse and Pierce 1986), much of the 
increased use of the middle position is from respondents without attitude relevant knowledge. 
In other words, there is good reason to believe that many of these middle responses on the 
standard form are actually hidden nonattitudes meaning that respondents are being asked 
about attitude objects they know little or nothing about (Smith 1984). 
To arrive at this finding we examined the answers provided by respondents with 
attitude relevant knowledge and those without attitude relevant knowledge. The nonattitudes 
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literature suggests that respondents feel pressure to provide some kind of an answer to survey 
items and that the strength of the attitude that a person holds varies along a dimension called 
centrality. Centrality is conceptualized as the proportion of time that one spends thinking 
about an attitude object (Converse 1970), or more concretely as the amount of information 
that one has about the attitude object (Schuman 1996). Attitude objects of high centrality are 
thought to represent crystallized opinions (Schuman and Presser 1980); that is, opinions that 
respondent have thought about, and most importantly, ones that existed prior to the time that 
the person was introduced to a survey item about the attitude object. 
This study utilized recent participation in recreational activities as an indicator of the 
amount of thought that persons have given to their opinions about those same activities. 
Cognitive state response outcome mapping was then used to show which response options 
were chosen by those with knowledge and which response options were chosen by those 
without knowledge. This mapping revealed that those without knowledge about an attitude 
object are prone to give middle responses on a standard form, but use the no opinion or don't 
know options when they are offered. This effect is most noticeable for the satisfaction items, 
where one would expect that a person would need some experience with an activity to report 
whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied. 
A two cognitive state-response outcome mapping is admittedly a rough diagnosis of 
one's cognitive state. Studies have shown there are likely to be degrees of knowing rather 
than a simple dichotomy of knowing or not knowing (Reder 1988). Beatty and Hermann 
(1995) suggest that four cognitive states are relevant. These four cognitive states occur 
where information is available, accessible, generatable, or inestimable. The middle two 
cognitive states were not used in this study. Although recent research (Beatty and Hermann 
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2002) has used individual self reports of one's cognitive states (i.e. accessible or generatable), 
there are not very clearly defined standards to distinguish between the middle cognitive states. 
Thus it is difficult to tell at what point someone moves from holding a generatable attitude to 
holding an accessible attitude. Furthermore, this line is bound to vary substantially by 
research topic. 
Perhaps the best method for gaining insight into a respondent's cognitive state is the 
use of cognitive interviewing (Beatty and Hermann 1995). Cognitive interviewing could 
utilize think aloud techniques and probes to better understand respondents. This kind of 
interviewing could be carried out in the pre-test stage of survey implementation to learn 
respondents' cognitive states. Once survey designers have an idea of the ease or difficulty 
that respondents have answering questions, they can make better decisions about whether no 
opinion or don't know options should be included. In addition, the cognitive state response 
outcome mapping procedure can be used during pre-tests to anticipate any potential problems 
that might be due to satisficing or nonattitude holding. Researchers might utilize different 
strategies before the implementation of a survey to solve these problems. If nonattitude 
holding is a problem, for example, the researcher might consider filtering. If satisficing is a 
problem, then one might consider increasing the respondents' motivation for responding to 
survey questions. 
While much of this discussion has focused so far on the problem of nonattitudes and 
no opinion options, there is also the problem of satisficing that can be associated with the no 
opinion option. A limitation of the data here is that the problem of satisficing might be 
underestimated for two reasons. First, there were a low number of users of the recreational 
activities. satisficing was operationalized as someone who has attitude relevant experience 
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(i.e. participate in an activity), but does not express an attitude. Perhaps a study with a higher 
percentage of respondents with attitude relevant experience would show a larger satisficing 
problem. Second, if people do have accessible or generatable attitudes and don't report them 
one might also consider these as satisficing responses. Both of these reasons indicate that 
satisficing might be underestimated in this study. 
The analysis did illustrate there might be a small satisficing effect. That is, 
respondents with attitude relevant experience did choose the no opinion option. However, 
what is interesting is that the satisficing did not seem to reduce the number of positive or 
negative attitudes reported. It appears that these responses came from respondents who were 
likely to offer middle responses on the standard form. If that is the case, the satisficing due 
to a no opinion option does not seem to be any stronger than satisficing with a middle option 
(i.e. endorsing the status quo). Once again, any conclusions about satisficing are somewhat 
tenuous due to the low number of participants in most of the activities. 
An additional frustration with the operationalization of satisficing is that it closely 
resembles the problem of item ambiguity or ambivalence. That is, how do we distinguish 
between someone who has attitude relevant experience and does not report an attitude due to 
lack of motivation, and someone who has attitude relevant experience but does not report an 
attitude due to ambivalence or item ambiguity? In fact, it would be difficult to identify the 
difference between the two behaviors. 
The nonattitudes and satisficing theoretical approaches have provided an 
understanding of the possible causes of no opinion responses. This thesis provides added 
evidence to the notion that respondents who do not have experience with an attitude object 
still feel pressure to provide an answer to a survey item. Moreover it provides further 
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evidence that the "play it safe alternative" (Smith 1984) of circling a middle response is a 
suitable alternative for these respondents who do not have the option of expressing no 
opinion. Regarding support for the satisficing approach it is difficult to draw any conclusion 
due to many of the limitations that were discussed previously. The thesis did find some 
evidence that satisficing is slightly more likely to occur with a no opinion option than a don't 
know option. However, this effect could be relatively small as indicated by the size of the 
confidence intervals. 
Nonetheless, it is useful for one to check for both of these possibilities when 
considering the inclusion of a no opinion option. What is evident from the literature on no 
opinion and don't know responding is that it is very difficult to apply a one size fits all 
strategy when deciding whether to include such an option. One needs to consider a diverse 
range of causes of no opinion responding. Thinking in terms of nonattitudes and satisficing 
is a useful framework to assist the researcher with these considerations. 
An additional finding that supports the use of no opinion or don't know filters regards 
the variation in the response rates across the experimental groups in the study. Although the 
overall response rate (42%) for the survey was somewhat low, higher response rates were 
achieved on both the no opinion form (45%) and don't know form (45%) compared to the 
standard form (37%). This finding conflicts with previous research (Poe et al. 1988) that has 
shown that no opinion filters have no effect on response rates. One distinction between this 
study and past research on the impact of filters on response rates is that past research 
addressed factual questions and this research addressed attitude questions. Perhaps future 
research might explore the impact of filters on response rates for factual and attitude 
questions. 
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The low overall response rate could indicate a lack of interest in the questionnaire. 
One logical conclusion to reach is that respondents who do not have existing opinions about 
many issues in a questionnaire might.become frustrated when they are forced to select 
substantive options on a questionnaire. The higher response rates for the groups with either a 
no opinion or don't know option might indicate that adding a filter is one way to reduce this 
frustration and encourage the respondent to answer items later in the questionnaire. This has 
the effect reducing unit nonresponse at the expense of increasing item non response for the 
questions about recreational activities. However, it is beneficial for questions later in the 
questionnaire when respondents are able to quickly move through early questions for which 
they do not have opinions by circling a no opinion or don't know option. Quickly moving 
through these items reduces the burden placed on the respondent in terms of the time that 
they must take to formulate an opinion about an object that they have little knowledge about. 
In conclusion, this thesis generally finds support for the use of no opinion filters, but 
does not identify a difference between a filter labeled no opinion or a filter labeled don't 
know. It seems these labels can be used interchangeably. The main support for the use of 
filters is that, without such an option, many individuals will feel obliged to answer a survey 
question and choose an option such as the middle option. The results indicate that the 
standard form results in more people expressing less qualified opinions. By circling a middle 
position respondents might actually be expressing their intention to provide a no opinion 
response. Therefore, the use of a no opinion option is recommended particularly on issues 
where the public might have a low knowledge base. 
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APPENDIX A: PERCENT DISTRIBUTIONS 
During the past 12 months, how often have you or other members of your household 
PARTICIPATED in the following activities at parks and recreation areas in Dallas County? 
(Percentages shown in tables) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1-2 3-4 5 or more 
Standard Form (n=115) _N  ti_ ti_ ti_ 
1. Bicycling  66 15 7 12 
2. Birdwatching  83 9 5 4 
3. Boating/canoeing  77 14 6 4 
4. Camping  83 9 2 6 
5. Cross-country skiing  99 0 1 0 
6. Cultural activities  84 15 0 1 
7. Fishing/ice fishing  69 16 4 12 
8. Horseback riding  91 5 3 1 
9. Hunting/trapping  85 7 3 5 
10. Nature programs  90 9 0 1 
11. Off-road All Terrain Vehicle operation, 
93 4 1 snowmobiling  3
12. Off-road (mountain) biking 97 2 0 1 
13. Picnicking  70 17 7 5 
14. Swimming  76 13 3 9 
15. Visiting historic sites  77 19 3 2 
16. Visiting museums  81 15 3 2 
17. Walking/hiking/jogging/rollerblading  54 19 6 20 
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1-2 3-4 5 or more 
No opinion form (n=138) _Neve_r, times tim_ ti 
1. Bicycling  61 16 9 13 
2. Birdwatching  77 13 4 6 
3. Boating/canoeing  74 15 7 5 
4. Camping  74 19 3 4 
5. Cross-country skiing  97 2 0 1 
6. Cultural activities  80 18 1 1 
7. Fishing/ice fishing  70 12 9 8 
8. Horseback riding  95 3 1 1 
9. Hunting/trapping  85 5 2 8 
10. Nature programs  86 12 2 0 
11. Off-road All Terrain Vehicle operation, 91 4 1 4 
snowmobiling 
12. Off-road (mountain) biking 96 2 1 1 
13. Picnicking  53 33 9 5 
14. Swimming  76 12 7 5 
15. Visiting historic sites  73 20 6 1 
16. Visiting museums  79 14 5 2 
17. Walking/hiking/jogging/rollerblading  45 23 10 22 
1-2 3-4 5 or more 
Don't know form (n=140) _N  ti_ mes tip ti_mesr
1. Bicycling  61 16 9 14 
2. Birdwatching  78 11 3 7 
3. Boating/canoeing  79 13 4 5 
4. Camping  82 10 5 4 
5. Cross-country skiing  95 4 0 1 
6. Cultural activities  82 11 6 1 
7. Fishing/ice fishing  74 15 2 9 
8. Horseback riding  93 2 1 4 
9. Hunting/trapping  81 6 4 9 
10. Nature programs  88 9 3 1 
11. Off-road All Terrain Vehicle operation, 91 3 2 4 
snowmobiling 
12. Off-road (mountain) biking 96 4 1 0 
13. Picnicking  59 27 7 6 
14. Swimming  77 8 4 11 
15. Visiting historic sites  67 18 4 4 
16. Visiting museums  80 15 5 1 
17. Walkinglhiking/jogging/rollerblading  46 21 6 26 
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APPENDIX B : COGNITIVE STATE-RESPONSE OUTCOME MAPPING B Y ITEM 
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